MAJOR COURT DECISIONS*

AMERICAN PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS COUN-

Cm

v. FCC

215 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

Issue: Whether the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC") per-call compensation fee
plan for coinless "dial around" calls, which does
not include a bad debt figure or a collection cost
figure and rests on data based on marginal rather
than average payphones, ensures that all
payphone service providers ("PSPs") are fairly
compensated as required under Section 276 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996
Act").
Holding: The court held that the FCC's per-call
compensation fee plan for coinless "dial around"
calls was not arbitrary or capricious, and thus did
not violate Section 276 of the 1996 Act.
Discussion: PSPs are independent payphone service providers that compete with Local Exchange
Carriers ("LEC"), and generate their revenue
from either coin calls or contracts with interexchange carriers for collect and calling card
calls. Prior to the 1996 Act, PSPs were largely uncompensated for "dial around" coinless callscalls made using a long-distance carrier other
than the payphone's subscribed carrier. Section
276 of the 1996 Act requires that the FCC establish a per-call compensation plan that fairly compensates all PSPs for every completed intrastate
and interstate call made using their payphone.
The court previously remanded the following
two FCC attempts to set the price for each call,
holding that the methods used in establishing
these rates represented arbitrary and capricious
decision making: 1) a market-based surrogate that
established the rate at 35 cents, and 2) an actual
marked-based rate with a starting point of 35
cents, minus 6.6 cents per call, which represented
the difference between coin and coinless calls.
However, the court upheld the FCC's third attempt to set a fair compensation rate at 24 cents.
PSPs argued that the rate was too low and thus did
not fairly compensate them as required under
Section 276 of the 1996 Act. The court disagreed
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and held that the rate, as established by the FCC,
was not a result of arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking. The court noted that the FCC's decision
to exclude the bad debt figure because it lacked
reliability was reasonable, particularly in this new
area of regulation. The court also found that the
FCC fairly accounted for the sales, as well as general and administrative costs, by including joint
and common payphone overhead costs. Finally,
the court concluded that it was not unreasonable
or arbitrary for the FCC to rely upon data based
on marginal payphones, which covered costs but
were otherwise unprofitable, as opposed to average payphone costs because the data provider explained how it was developed and its shortcomings.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. RENO

217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether preliminary injunction is warranted against enforcement of the Child Online
Protection Act ("COPA").
Holding: The court affirmed the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of COPA because the ACLU's attack
on its constitutionality is likely to succeed on the
merits.
Discussion: Previously, on First Amendment
grounds, the Supreme Court struck down the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), the government's first attempt to control the dissemination of indecent material to minors via the Internet. This court determined that the ACLU's
constitutional attack on COPA-the government's next attempt to control the knowing dissemination of "harmful material" to minors via
the Internet for "commercial purposes," as measured by "contemporary community standards"is likely to succeed on its merits. Therefore, the
district court's granting of a preliminary injunction was appropriate.
First, the court agreed with the district court
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that COPA's restriction is content-based and must
be reviewed under strict scrutiny. The court then
acknowledged that the government's interest in
protecting minors from harmful material is compelling, but found that COPA's "harmful material" and "contemporary community standards"
alone would likely ensure COPA's unconstitutionality. The court stated that this is due to the technological inability to restrict access to the Internet
based on geographic locale and therefore the inability to measure according to each community's
standards. Thus, regulating according to "contemporary community standards" poses an impermissible burden on the First Amendment because
whether a site is harmful to minors would be measured by the most conservative community standard.
The court considered whether the statute could
be saved by a more narrow interpretation or deletion of the unconstitutional portion of the statute.
However, the court determined that the "contemporary community standard" has historically been
a geographical standard, and there is no proffered evidence suggesting otherwise. Next, the
court held that striking "contemporary community standards" would not likely salvage COPA because it is an integral, and not independent, part
of COPA. The court then determined that if the
preliminary injunction were not issued, COPA-affected web publishers' speech would be curtailed
and any loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury. The court then found
that the injury to web publishers subject to COPA
outweighed the harm if the preliminary injunction was not issued because web publishers would
have to censor constitutionally protected speech
and incur substantial financial costs to implement
COPA's affirmative defenses. The court summed
up its support of the district court's issuance of a
preliminary injunction by finding that constitutional protection of speech is in the public interest.
AT&T

COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN

STATES, INC. V. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

229 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2000)

Issue: Whether the district court may review a

negotiated element of an interconnection agreement, and if so, whether the district court erred in
striking a provision from the interconnection
agreement.
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Holding: The court held that the district court
may review negotiated elements of an interconnection agreement to determine whether they are
consistent with the 1996 Act. The court remanded
the case to the district court for review following
the Supreme Court's decision to vacate FCC Rule
47 C.F.R. § 51.319 ("Rule 319"), which was the underlying basis for district's court's decision to
strike the provision from the interconnection
agreement.
Discussion: This case arose following a competing local exchange carrier's ("CLEC") request for
review of an interconnection agreement with the
incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). On
review, the district court struck a paragraph from
the negotiated agreement because it found that
the paragraph was inconsistent with the 1996 Act.
Subsequently the CLEC appealed, but following
the appeal and before the oral arguments, the Supreme Court changed the law that supported the
district court's decision to strike the paragraph as
inconsistent with the 1996 Act. The Supreme
Court vacated Rule 319, which called for a minimum number of network elements an ILEC must
make available to the requesting carrier, finding
that the FCC failed to adhere to the "necessary
and impair" standards when it mandated Rule
319. This court remanded to the district court for
reconsideration of whether to strike the provision
of the interconnection agreement. The court also
held that because the provision closely tracked
the controlling law, in this case Section 251 (c) (3),
the presumption is that it was negotiated and that
the district court may review all negotiated provisions to ensure consistency with the 1996 Act.
PEAVY V. WFAA-TV, INC.
221 F.3d 158
(5th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether the Federal Wiretap Act ("the
Act") is vague and overbroad, and whether the
Act provides civil redress for the procurement of
unlawful interceptions of covered communication. Also, whether the Act deserves strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment.
Holding: The Act is constitutional and does not
provide for civil redress for the procurement of
unlawful interceptions of covered communication. Further, the Act deserves intermediate scrutiny because it is content-neutral and furthers an
important government- interest-that of prohibiting unlawful interception of covered communica-
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tion-and does so by only incidentally burdening
the First Amendment.
Discussion: This case arose following a neighbor's taping of a school board trustee's cordless
telephone conversations, which were transferred
to a television station and its reporter, allegedly
violating the Act and other state law claims. The
district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant television station and its reporter. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in
part and remanded. The Act precludes interception of any wire, oral or electronic communication. This court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the civil procurement claim
because the Act is unambiguous and redresses
"use" and "disclosure," not procurement of unlawful interception of another. This court reversed
the district court's summary judgment for the television station by finding that the Act is contentneutral and survives intermediate scrutiny because it prohibits all unlawfully obtained information independent of subject matter. Furthermore,
the Act poses only an incidental burden not specific to the media and advances an important governmental interest, which is protecting the privacy
of covered communication. Finally, the court held
that the Act is not vague and overbroad, and that
there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the television station disclosed the
contents of the unlawful interceptions and other
state law issues.
MCI

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

CORP. V. ILLI-

Co. 222 F.3d 323 (7th
Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether private carriers -may sue state
commissions and their commissioners in federal
court for violations of Sections 251 and 252 of the
1996 Act.
Holding: Several cases were consolidated. By affirming, reversing and remanding the district
court's grant and denial of motions for Eleventh
Amendment immunity respectively, the court
held that the state commissions and their commissioners waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity by participating in the regulatory scheme created by the 1996 Act. The court also held that the
Ex parte Young doctrine does not preclude suit
against the state's-commissioners.
Discussion:The court rested its decision on Col,
NOIS BELL TELEPHONE

lege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct 2219 (1999), where
that Court held that constructive waivers are only
permitted when the Congress conditions a gift on
that state's waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity. In particular, the court found that under
the 1996 Act, Congress invited states to regulate
interconnection agreements and other elements
of the local telephone market. A state's acceptance of this offer is voluntary. Congress' gift to the
state is federal regulatory power and the acceptance of the gift's condition, as evidenced by a
state exercising regulatory authority under the
1996 Act, constitutes a state's waiver of sovereign
immunity. The court also held that the carriers
were not barred by the Ex pane Young doctrine
from proceeding with their federal claims for
equitable relief against each commissioner. The
1996 Act does not provide for a detailed remedial
scheme, and the challenge is prospective and
ongoing because it concerns whether the state
commissioner's decisions are in line with the 1996
Act.

SOUTHWESTERN
COMMUNICATIONS

BELL CO. V.
CORP.

CONNECT

225 F.3d 942 (8th

Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether Section 252(e)(6) of the 1996
Act grants federal courts jurisdiction to review a
state commission's order interpreting and enforcing an interconnection agreement.
Holding: The court reversed the district court
and held that Section 252(e) (6), as part of the
1996 Act, grants federal courts jurisdiction to review state commission enforcement proceedings
for compliance with federal law.
Discussion: Under the 1996 Act, which seeks to
improve competition in the local telephone service market, the state commission, or in its absence the FCC, must approve interconnection
agreements between the incumbent and the new
carrier. The state must ensure that the agreement
complies with certain requirements of the 1996
Act and enforce certain state law requirements.
Following an interconnection agreement and approval by the Arkansas Public Service Commission
(the "state Commission"), a dispute developed between Southwestern Bell and Connect over the reciprocal compensation arrangement. Connect
filed a complaint and was granted declaratory relief by the state Commission. Southwestern filed
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suit in a federal court against Connect and the
state Commission, challenging the state Commission's decision. The district court granted the
state Commission and Connects' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the 1996 Act grants federal court's jurisdiction only to determine if interconnection
agreements meet federal law requirements, not to
review a state Commission's order interpreting
and enforcing an interconnection agreement.
The court of appeals reversed. The court held
that the 1996 Act applies "in any case in which a
[s]tate [C]ommission makes a 'determination'
under section 252," and "any party aggrieved by
such determination may bring an action in an appropriate federal district court to determine
whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and this section [252]."
216
AT&T CORP. V. CITY OF PORTLAND
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether a local cable franchising authority may condition a transfer of a cable franchise
upon the cable operator's grant of unrestricted
access to its cable broadband transmission facilities for Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") other
than the operator's proprietary service.
Holding: Because a cable service that provides
Internet service through its cable lines is acting as
a telecommunications carrier, the Communications Act preempts a local franchising authority's
condition that a franchisee grant access to its
broadband transmission facilities.
Discussion: Under the Cable Act, local franchising authorities retain the ability to regulate cable
services, but the Cable Act preempts most state
law regarding telecommunications services. The
city of Portland agreed to permit a transfer of control of the city's cable lines to AT&T on condition
that AT&T open its cable modem platform to
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competing ISPs. AT&T challenged the condition
on the grounds that it violated the Cable Act, the
First Amendment, the Commerce Clause and the
Contract Clause under the Constitution. The
Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court's decision, found that a cable modem Internet service is
a telecommunications service under the Cable
Act. Therefore, Portland's condition on the transfer of control violated Section 541 (b) (3) (c) of the
Cable Act, which vests the regulation of telecommunications carriers with the FCC, not local
franchising authorities.
MCI

TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. PUB-

LIC SERVICE COMM'N OF UTAH

216 F.3d 929

(10th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether Utah constructively waived its
sovereign immunity when it arbitrated an interconnection dispute under Section 252 of the 1996
Act.
Holding: The court affirmed the district court's
denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on
Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, holding
that Utah constructively waived its sovereign immunity when it arbitrated the interconnection dispute under Section 252 of the 1996 Act.
Discussion:Congress passed the 1996 Act to encourage local competition in the telecommunications industry. To accomplish this goal, Congress
established baseline rules for companies interested in providing communications services. Section 251 of the 1996 Act places several duties on
an ILEC to facilitate market entry. An ILEC's primary obligation is to share its network with its
competitors. Section 252 of the 1996 Act permits
an incumbent and a new carrier to privately agree
on the terms of an interconnection agreement
and if that fails, either party under Section
252(a)(1) may petition the state Commission,
which regulates the local phone service, to arbitrate open issues.

